

# IN THE SHADOW OF GUNS: ARMAMENT TRENDS OF THE PKK & YPG TERRORIST NETWORK

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT	PAGES
FOREWORD	1-2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
THE PROBLEM OF THE PKK ARMAMENT: GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY-STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK	4
PKK TERRORISM AND HYBRID WARFARE CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS	4-5
MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (MANPADS)	5-6
ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILES (ATGM) AND OTHER ANTI-TANK WEAPON SYSTEMS	7-8-9
MINI UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	10
COUNTERMEASURES AND STRATEGY: POLITICAL-MILITARY FRAMEWORK AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS	11
COUNTERING PKK & YPG MANPADS CAPABILITY	11-12
COUNTERING PKK DRONE PROGRAM	13
COUNTERING ATGM AND OTHER ANTI-TANK CAPABILITIES	13-14



## FOREWORD

This study examines the lethal arsenal of the PKK and YPG terrorist network through open-source intelligence (OSINT) methods. The report consists of two main chapters.

In the first chapter, we present a thorough military-strategic and operational assessment of the arsenal, along with policy recommendations. The second part highlights the weapon systems in more detail.

The report covers the prominent weaponry of tactical and operational importance for the PKK & YPG and should not be read as a comprehensive listing. The PKK & YPG may have other arms that could not be detected through open-source evidence, or deliberately neglected due to their doubtful significance. Despite potential shortcomings, the mapping out of the PKK & YPG lethal arsenal will enable tangible policy recommendations for Turkey's counterterrorism strategy.

Our first policy recommendation focuses on countermeasures against specific weapon categories. For example, the necessary measures against the MANPADS threat are different in their scope and operational aspects, compared to strategies aimed at PKK's developing drone program. Precisely for this reason, in the following sections, we provide tailor-made political-military and counterterrorism intelligence recommendations.

Another complementary analytical framework not covered in this report, as it is beyond the scope of this particular study, remains the mapping of the origin and supply chains of these weapon systems. Overall, the PKK & YPG's arsenal is fed by three different supply channels. The first important route is assistance by state actors. The United States has supplied weapons to the YPG / SDF in its fight against the ISIS threat.<sup>1</sup> Other countries such as Iran, Syria, and Russia have also provided weapons to the PKK. The second categorical source is international arms trafficking and the illegal sale of weapons. Thirdly, regional instability leads to new capabilities as nation-state inventories get out of control in times of political unrest. Developments in Iraq and Syria are textbook examples of this phenomenon, as multiple terrorist groups have captured and used conventional military arms throughout the conflict from the arms caches.

This report also sheds light on the potential Turkish foreign and defense policy initiatives. The foremost of these would revolve around bilateral and multilateral diplomacy efforts. Counterterrorism is already a key pillar in Ankara's foreign policy. However, Turkey can further enhance its consultations with its partners upon the concrete OSINT-based evidence. In addition, this EDAM report, based on transparent and referenced facts, may advance the debate by informing a broader strategic audience in certain countries that have been unresponsive to Turkey's demands in the fight against terrorism.

Turkey needs more proactive diplomacy efforts in its relations with the United States. Ankara must demand transparency regarding the anti-ISIS armament program, a promise Washington made several years ago. Additionally, there has to be an emphasis on implementing a comprehensive program to reclaim the weapons / weapon systems provided to the YPG. Washington's willingness to meet Turkey's demands will strongly be correlated with the stance of the Turkey-US relationship.

As part of its counterterrorism efforts, Turkey can benefit from NATO as a multilateral political platform. The Alliance defined terrorism in its Strategic Concept of 1999 as a threat that affects the Allies' collective security. Since then, NATO's framework has evolved with respect to both the doctrine and institutionalization of the fight against terrorism. The NATO 2030 Report,<sup>2</sup> while providing recommendations on the future of NATO, emphasized that the fight against terrorism should have a bigger weight within the Alliance. Turkey reaffirms the fight against terrorism, as a mission with more political support. Therefore, NATO needs an in-house mechanism where Turkey can easily express its expectations from the Alliance. However, the sustainability of such an effort at the multilateral level depends on participatory intelligence sharing. We believe that this is where EDAM's OSINT report can play a foundational role. As the examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria showcased, vulnerabilities caused by civil wars and regional political instability lead to the emergence and spread of extremist networks. Therefore, such dynamics enable the flow of arms to violent groups that threatens NATO's collective security just like Turkey's national security at large. It is now possible to use this report and future complementary OSINT studies to better inform the international strategic community.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The PKK & YPG terrorist network is entering a new phase of "hybrid warfare" in terms of its armed capacity. This new trend poses a significant threat to Turkey's national security. The terrorist organization is likely to develop an asymmetric combat capability akin to the Lebanese Hezbollah or Hamas, except for these groups' tactical ballistic missiles and heavy rocket arsenals.
- In particular, the YPG & PKK's man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), and mini-unmanned aerial vehicles pose severe threats to conventional formations.
- A thorough monitoring of regional conflict and armament trends is critical to address the threat at its source. Turkey needs to prevent the PKK terrorist organization from acquiring further game-changing weaponry such as the RPG-30 anti-tank rocket launchers or SA-25 Verba MANPADS.
- In the early 1990s, with the First Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's forces lost control over an important share of their arsenal which led to a drastic increase in the PKK's combat capacity. A similar situation emerged more recently during the Syrian Civil War. Besides the loss of control by the Syrian Arab Army, the Syrian Mukhabarat has systematically provided arms to the PKK for decades.
- Illegal arms flowing into Syria and the weapons transferred to groups that have organic ties to the PKK have further deteriorated the security situation. The weapons seized during Operation Claw-Lightning & Thunderbolt in Iraq provide significant evidence showcasing the trans-border characteristics of the PKK & YPG's arsenal.
- PKK's terrorist activity in the 1990s triggered a systemic transformation in Turkey's military capacity. The Turkish Armed Forces' doctrinal order of battle has transformed from the Cold War-era's bulky, division-based structure into a more flexible structure centered on brigades. At the time, Turkey also introduced air-mobile and mountain commando units, attack helicopters, formed and effectively used special forces, and carried out systematic cross-border operations, which, overall, led to military success in the 1990s. However, hybrid warfare and terrorism environment of the 21st century is significantly different from the low-intensity conflict battlegrounds of the 1990s.
- To tackle the emerging national security threat, Turkey must prioritize the following strategic frameworks:
  - A) Adopting a specific strategy targeting the PKK terrorist network's critical capabilities and requirements.
  - B) Targeting the game-changer weapon systems and supply networks of the YPG & PKK plot,
  - C) Defeating the PKK's drone program.
- Thorough monitoring of regional conflicts will remain critical for coming decades. A smart analysis of the 2006 Lebanese Hezbollah-Israeli Defense Forces conflict would have, for instance, left little room for surprise in Syria for Turkish decision-makers. Turkey needs to develop a comprehensive strategic analysis & open-source intelligence capacity to address similar problems in the future.

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## THE PROBLEM OF THE PKK ARMAMENT: GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY-STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

By the end of the last century, the PKK terrorism gained more freedom of movement in Northern Iraq and as to its operational capacity on Turkish soil. These developments occurred due to three main factors: the Iran-Iraq war, the Anfal Campaign and the First Gulf War.

At the time, the PKK had gained strategic depth, found a safe-haven where it could take refuge when it suffered heavy losses. In the early 1990s, Ankara faced Iraq producing instability, and the PKK took this opportunity rooting itself deep in the mountainous northern frontier of the country.

The operational capacity of the PKK increased as Soviet-era weapons spread to the black market, and the inventory of Saddam Hussein's forces in the aftermath of the Gulf War was left untraced. Senior Turkish commanders of the period stated that "the PKK has reached an abundance of weapons that it has never seen before".<sup>3</sup>


## PKK TERRORISM AND HYBRID WARFARE CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS



A 2010 RAND Corporation report examining the performance of the Israel Defense Forces in the Lebanese and Gaza theaters broke down the IDF's campaigns into operational design, actor types, and arsenal segments. The report reveals that asymmetrical groups conducting irregular warfare in low-intensity conflicts generally use short-range rockets, light weapons, early generation RPGs, and portable mortars. When the basic parameters of the armed conflict environment shift from low-intensity conflict to hybrid warfare, unconventional actors acquire game-changer capabilities. These include advanced rockets, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).<sup>4</sup>

3 For details see Hasan Kudankçı, Güneydoğu'da Unutulmayanlar. İstanbul: Alfa Basın Yayım Dağıtım, 2007

4 David E. Johnson, Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza, RAND, 2010, p.5.



The PKK is still far from missile and heavy rocket capabilities comparable to those in the hands of Hamas or the Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the PKK's lethal arsenal has developed into a critical phase of hybrid warfare capabilities mainly in three segments - MANPADS, anti-tank weapons, and mini-unmanned aerial vehicles.

## MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (MANPADS)

MANPADS pose significant threats to aircraft below 10-15 thousand feet, especially against rotary-wing platforms and fixed-wing aircraft traveling at low speeds, as well as commercial aviation. The PKK used first-generation MANPADS (e.g., SA-7 Strela) in the 1990s and gained second and third-generation (e.g., SA-16 and SA-18) MANPADS capabilities throughout the Syrian Civil War. Second-generation MANPADS (i.e. the Chinese-made FN-6) include advanced features such as flare counter-measures and other filters, increasing the chances of hitting targeted aircraft. Third-generation MANPADS, such as the SA-18, search broad bands and work on the 'shape' of the target platform, along with advanced flare & decoy counter-measures.<sup>5</sup>

First-generation MANPADS guidance systems such as SA-7 have limited target acquisition capacities, as they can approach targets only through a certain angle. Unlike their first-generation predecessors, second-and third-generation MANPADS, such as the SA-16 and SA-18, benefit from more sophisticated guidance and target acquisition systems.

→  
*SA-7B MANPADS trigger mechanism seized from the PKK during the Operations Claw-Lightning and Thunderbolt<sup>6</sup>*



→  
*SA-18 MANPADS seized from the PKK during 2018 Operation Olive Branch. A system of the same type was previously used in the downing of a Turkish attack helicopter.<sup>7</sup>*



The fourth-generation MANPADS are much more advanced than their predecessors. The Russian-made Verba (SA-25) is highly effective against unmanned aerial vehicles with lower thermal traces, as well as deceptive countermeasures.<sup>8</sup> Open-source reports suggest that Verba has also been integrated into air defense networks, enabling personnel to track beyond sight through information projected onto the operator's helmet.<sup>9</sup>

6 Republic of Turkey Ministry of National Defense, <https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/1452021-60458>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.

7 Anadolu Ajansı, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gunur-basliklari/afinde-hava-savunma-fuzesi-ele-gecirildi/1052257>, Retrieval Date: 6 Haziran 2021.

8 For related MANPADS capabilities see ilgili MANPADS yetenekleri için bkz. KBM, <https://www.kbm.ru/en/production/pzrk/803.html>, Erişim Tarihi: 5 June 2021.

9 Ibid.



## ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILES (ATGM) AND OTHER ANTI-TANK WEAPON SYSTEMS

As regards to modern hybrid warfare trends, advanced anti-armor and anti-tank systems pose significant challenges to conventional formations and can inflict high casualties.

The PKK & YPG terrorist network has benefited from the spread of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces arsenal, as well as the proliferation of Soviet-Russian anti-tank missiles and other anti-tank weapons. Furthermore, the YPG received some of Western anti-armor weaponry under anti-ISIS efforts. Some of these arms were directly transferred to the core-PKK ranks in northern Iraq, and even Turkey.

The threat of anti-tank guided missiles in the Syrian battle-space is higher than almost anywhere else in the world. Overall, these systems have an effective range of up to about five kilometers. They are survivable due to their small size and mobility. Militant groups use anti-tank systems to attack a wide range of targets, from armored vehicles to military bases or outposts. In addition, conflict data from Syria reveals that attacks with guided anti-tank missiles have been frequent in residential areas, deployed in high-ground relative to the target.

Open-source evidence indicates that the PKK & YPG arsenal includes a wide variety of weapon systems in kind. For example, the YPG received the US-made BGM-71 TOW ATGMs, and the PKK acquired and used the system. In addition, the terrorist network received or probably captured the Soviet-Russian-made 9M113 Konkurs (AT-5) ATGM from the Syrian Arab Armed Forces or other armed opposition groups.



*The image shows some of the weapons seized from the PKK & YPG Terrorist Organization in Azez, Syria.*

*Among the seized weapons, two TOW ATGMs are of great importance.<sup>10</sup>*

Along with the Syrian Civil War, the PKK & YPG benefit from illegal arms trafficking as another major source for armament. The terrorist network acquired former Yugoslavian-made M79 OSA anti-tank weapons, most probably from black markets.

At the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, the M79 OSA 90mm anti-tank launchers were spotted in the hands of armed opposition groups. Open-source evidence suggests two potential supply routes for the transfer of the system to non-state groups. The first one is via Croatia, which was not yet a member of the E.U. at the beginning of the civil war and had the abovementioned weapons in its arsenal. The second potential source is Libya, as irregular groups captured the Libyan military's arms after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime.<sup>11</sup> During the Syrian Civil War, the PKK & YPG probably seized some of these weapons.

*PKK & YPG Militants Carrying Former Yugoslavian M79 90mm Anti-Tank Weapon.<sup>12</sup>*

# M79 90mm Anti-Tank Weapon



<sup>11</sup> Michael Weiss, "Are Syrian Rebels Now Armed with Heavy Weapons from Croatia?", Atlantic Council, February 2013, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/are-syrian-rebels-now-armed-with-heavy-weapons-from-croatia/>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.

<sup>12</sup> Military Times, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/05/10/us-weapons-will-soon-flow-to-kurds-as-they-isolate-isis-fighters-in-raqqa/>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.

One of the critical arms recently obtained by the PKK & YPG is the AT-4 anti-tank weapon. Although not in the same league with more advanced Russian and US-made guided anti-tank missiles (ATGM), the AT-4 can be very effective in the hands of an asymmetric actor. The U.S. assistance to the YPG prior to the Raqqa campaigns already included TOW ATGMs to counter VBIEDs and maneuver platforms used by ISIS.<sup>13</sup> The AT-4, thus offered a light and complementary capability in addition to heavier ATGMs.

The AT-4 family, with Swedish and U.S. variants, is an 84mm effective infantry-support weapon against standard armored platforms. Compared to guided anti-tank missiles, the unit cost is low, and the launchers can easily be carried and operated by the personnel. With the new variants (e.g., the US CS - confined space-variant), the probability of recoil and unintentional damage to the operator and friendly surroundings is considerably reduced. Thus, the AT-4 CS variant has become more suitable for use in residential areas, with its more advanced aiming systems.<sup>14</sup>



*Turkish security forces seized the weapons in the visual from the PKK during the Operations Claw-Lightning & Thunderbolt.<sup>15</sup> Indicated by the Arrow Sign on the left is the AT-4 Anti-Tank Weapon.*



*AT-4 anti-tank weapons seized from the PKK Terrorist Organization in Hakkari rural during a counter-terror operation<sup>16</sup>*



13 Military Times, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/05/10/us-weapons-will-soon-flow-to-kurds-as-they-isolate-isis-fighters-in-raqqa/>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.  
 14 For a detailed assessment see Charlie Gao, "You're Toast: These Old Rocket Launchers Still Pack a Nasty Punch", The National Interest, Nisan 2021, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/youre-toast-these-old-rocket-launchers-still-pack-nasty-punch-181595>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.  
 15 Ministry of National Defense, <https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/752021-58513>, Date of Retrieval: 6 June 2021.  
 16 <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1265230805288263682/photo/1>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.

## MINI UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

We have assessed the PKK's drone program, along with its significance for the terrorist network, in our previous publications;

*"While the PKK used rotary-wing (quadcopter/multi-copter) drones since 2016, the group has also attempted attacks with fixed-wing, glider-type hull platforms. In addition, the PKK tried GPS-based automated navigation for mini UAVs to avoid remote controllers and risk of defeat by jammers. Rotary-wing quadcopter/multi-copter platforms and fixed-wing, glider-type UAVs have different ammunition drop-off speeds/angles and cruise speeds. Therefore, new threat parameters are more dangerous, especially in the long run. The terrorist organization is likely to develop more coordinated operational concepts in the use of drones. The recent examples are the attacks in Şırnak during the November 10, Atatürk commemoration events, (at least 1 UAV), the 23rd Infantry Division Command (2 UAVs), Kayatepe Base Area (1 UAV was shot down before reaching the target), Aydoğdu Base Area (1 UAV), Hamittepe Base Area (1 UAV) and 3 UAVs in the countryside. The Turkish press states that the attacks under investigation took place between 09.05 and 09.15 in about 10 minutes. In addition, Turkish security forces averted three more drone attacks in Şırnak just before 2019 New Year's Eve. Finally the timing and the targeted locations reveal the strategic intentions of the PKK terrorist organization.<sup>17</sup>*



*PKK Quadcopter Drone and Grenade Launcher Ammunition Seized in Ağrı in 2017 <sup>18</sup>*



*Fixed-wing drone of the PKK terrorist organization, landed in Şırnak Governor's Office on November 10, 2018, Atatürk Commemoration Ceremonies <sup>19</sup>*

17 Can Kasapoğlu, Bartış Kırdemir, Terör Tehdidinde Yeni Boyut: Drone Saldırıları ve Türkiye'nin Millî Güvenliğine İlişkin Gelişmeler, EDAM, 2019. pp.3-4.  
18 Ibid. p3.  
19 Ibid. p4..

## COUNTERMEASURES AND STRATEGY: POLITICAL-MILITARY FRAMEWORK AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Turkey should take comprehensive and multifaceted measures regarding the categories of weapons identified through OSINT data in this report. PKK's MANPADS require a special countermeasures roadmap, while the PKK's arsenal of drones require sophisticated containment steps. This section presents our recommendations to counter the PKK & YPG armament trends emphasized in this report.

Firstly, Turkey should demand more transparency from the U.S. concerning the anti-ISIS armament program, as Washington previously promised to provide. Ankara should seek more effective diplomatic steps towards implementing a concrete and comprehensive program to retrieve the weapon systems provided to PKK-affiliated groups. The future of the US-YPG relationship and the extent to which Washington will meet Ankara's demands are likely to be shaped by the Turkish-American ties.

### COUNTERING PKK & YPG MANPADS CAPABILITY

- As to MANPADS capabilities, the most critical components include T.B. (thermal battery) for first-generation systems and BCU (battery coolant unit) for more advanced systems. These sub-systems are crucial for the operability of MANPADS. In addition, these sub-systems are the components that are most affected by environmental conditions.



SA-7A and T.B. system <sup>20</sup>



SA-18 and BCU system <sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> US Missile and Space Intelligence Center, MANPADS Components Report, Retrieval Date: 5 June 2021.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

- Although some terrorist organizations and irregular groups try to develop different solutions (car and motorcycle batteries, etc.), such efforts do not always work efficiently.
- MANPADS dynamics have a critical place in the arms market. The first obstacle to creating a comprehensive database is that countries like Iran and North Korea are not transparent in reporting their MANPADS transactions. Secondly, these countries do not always declare missiles and sub-systems as part of arms transfers. Third, information on Iranian systems manufactured under Chinese license remain blurry and insufficient. Lastly there is the lack of sufficient data provided by the former Eastern Bloc manufacturers (i.e., MANPADS spare parts transfer from Bulgaria to the Arab Republic of Egypt). The industrial potential of former Warsaw Pact members, which is assumed to be inactive, is also remarkable.
- Since Soviet-Russian weaponry forms the backbone of the Syrian Arab Army's MANPADS arsenal, monitoring the transactions between the Baath regime and the PKK remains critical for Turkey's national security. Armenia, another client of the Russian MANPADS and a country enjoying ties with the PKK, also looms large in this respect.
- Tracking worldwide MANPADS proliferation and transfers remain essential for the Turkish counterterrorism strategy. Open-source reports indicate that there are 17,000 MANPADS in Syria and 9,000 MANPADS in Iraq.<sup>22</sup> The strategic surveillance should extend to third parties, such as North Korea, who sells arms to PKK-supporting states in the Middle East. OSINT evidence suggests that the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and the Armenian Armed Forces have procured 4th Generation Russian Verba MANPADS. In the case of Syria, deliberate transfer of such systems to the PKK terrorist organization or the prospects of Syrian military losing its grip on these game-changer weapons, will continue to be a potential threat.
- The most common type of MANPADS on the black market is the SA-7 and its variants. Non state entities have acquired and used advanced systems such as SA-18, SA-24 in various locations including Somalia, Libya and Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, counterterrorism intelligence needs constant updates and adaptation to the evolving threat environment.
- Turkish authorities should prioritize mapping the MANPADS supply chain of the PKK terrorist organization.

22

Ibid.

23

Ibid.

## COUNTERING PKK DRONE PROGRAM

- PKK's drone program goes beyond the tactical 'use of drones', and the terrorist network constantly develops new concepts.
- On May 19, 2021, the PKK attempted to attack the 8th Main Jet Base Command in Diyarbakır, using commercial UAVs. On the same day, 23rd Infantry Division Command in Şırnak and the UAV Base Command in Batman have also been targeted by drones. The Ministry of National Defense declared no casualties at the bases, while the security forces have intensified their anti-drone measures.
- PKK's UAVs now enjoy multifrequency cards, probably used to avoid being intercepted by anti-drone systems.<sup>24</sup> The level and use of the technical improvements indicate professional assistance to the terrorist organization in developing its drone program. In addition, the PKK has used the Mahmur Camp in northern Iraq to build its drone capacity in recent years.<sup>25</sup>
- To counter the PKK's drone program, Turkey should prioritize the following:
  - A) Mapping and destruction of system & sub-system supply lines,
  - B) Identification of militants with critical knowledge and technical skills,
  - C) Revealing and deterring foreign service assistance, if there is,
  - D) Investing in anti-drone systems with hard-kill & soft-kill capacity, especially for troops, facilities, and elements operating across borders and located in critical areas.

## COUNTERING ATGM AND OTHER ANTI-TANK CAPABILITIES

- The conflict patterns between the Israel Defense Forces and Lebanese Hezbollah in 2006 indicated the extent of the threat posed by anti-tank systems. Reports on the 2006 war reveal that 30 of Israel's 114 casualties were tank crews, at least 48 Israeli tanks and armored vehicles were hit, and 13 Merkava tanks were destroyed.<sup>26</sup>
- After the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, the future of tanks and armored vehicles in the 21<sup>st</sup> century battlefields has become a topical question among strategic community. Defense industries have developed active defense systems, modular design philosophies, and new sensor technologies to address the threat.<sup>27</sup>
- For Turkey, 2016 Operation Euphrates Shield, and its aftermath, demonstrated the challenges posed by the new security landscape. After the losses against terrorist organizations PKK & YPG

24 Hurriyet, <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/pkknin-dronlari-kanadadan-mi-41814380>, Retrieval Date: 7 June 2021.

25 Sabah, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2018/11/15/pkknin-drone-ussu-mahmurda>, Retrieval Date: 7 June 2021.

26 Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, U.S. Army, Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press Fort Leavenworth, 2008, p.64.

27 Defence IQ, <https://www.defenceiq.com/armoured-vehicles/articles/how-is-armoured-vehicle-survivability-changing>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.

and ISIS, the Turkish defense sector, under the leadership of Aselsan, started an active protection system program in cooperation with Ukraine. These systems with hard-kill (physical destruction) and hard-kill & soft-kill (functional destruction) capabilities (Pulat, Akkor) will significantly benefit Turkish armored platforms.<sup>28</sup>

- Nevertheless, lessons learned from recent conflicts show that active protection systems do not always provide a definitive solution. Offensive weapon systems with new designs aim to defeat tank and armored vehicle countermeasures. For example, the RPG-30, the latest of the Russian defense industry, fires a 42mm deceptive ammunition to deceive the active protection systems before firing the main ammunition with a tandem warhead.<sup>29</sup> The RPG-29, the predecessor of the RPG-30, was effective against some platforms of the Merkava family, Israel's main battle tank, in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Lebanese war.<sup>30</sup> Some reports suggest that the PKK terrorist organization already possesses the RPG-29, and some Israeli sources claimed that Lebanese Hezbollah acquired the RPG-30.<sup>31</sup> The claim in question, which has not yet been verified with OSINT data, strengthens the possibility that the irregular groups in the Syrian battlefield may acquire the RPG-30s soon.



RPG-30<sup>32</sup>

- Another way to defeat active protection systems is to 'saturate' the system with multiple threats to overwhelm its capacity.
- Given the abovementioned discussion, Turkey should pursue a pro-active military policy to disrupt the anti-armor capabilities of the PKK & YPG terrorist network. This military policy has to be augmented by a thorough diplomatic outreach to prevent further anti-tank weaponry transfers to the violent group.

28 Aselsan, <https://www.aselsan.com.tr/456db1db-e35c-4c89-bc7e-e29e6db3e07a.pdf>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021; Aselsan, <https://www.aselsan.com.tr/8677a6cc-8163-4a7e-88c4-21b9a6fc0431.pdf>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021

29 Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-rpg-threat-to-modern-nato-tanks-2017-6?r=US&IR=T>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.







30 Haaretz, <https://www.haaretz.com/1.4860368>, Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.

31 Israel National News, [https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/153102#.T0icm\\_WAna8](https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/153102#.T0icm_WAna8), Retrieval Date: 6 June 2021.







32 WIRED, <https://www.wired.com/2008/11/russia-unveils/>, Erişim Tarihi: 6 Haziran 2021.






## ARMORED PLATFORMS AND LAND VEHICLES

VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	HUMVEE (M1115)	<p><a href="https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7ml8mp">https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7ml8mp</a></p> <p><a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/DefenseUnits/status/908942729849094144">https://mobile.twitter.com/DefenseUnits/status/908942729849094144</a></p>
	M1117 Guardian	<p><a href="https://www.defenseworld.net/news/18390/US_Supplies_M117_Guardian_Armored_Vehicles_To_Anti_Assad_Anti_ISIS_Militia#.YEnu65Mza3I">https://www.defenseworld.net/news/18390/US_Supplies_M117_Guardian_Armored_Vehicles_To_Anti_Assad_Anti_ISIS_Militia#.YEnu65Mza3I</a></p>
	IAG Guardian	<p><a href="https://medium.com/war-is-boring/us-beefs-up-military-supplies-to-syrian-militia-8d75e58c4416">https://medium.com/war-is-boring/us-beefs-up-military-supplies-to-syrian-militia-8d75e58c4416</a></p>
	BTR 60PB	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/727574003582390272">https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/727574003582390272</a></p>
	<p>BTR-80*</p> <p><i>*Probably used by Russian Military Police, BTR-80 is seen in YPG inventory, also captured by the Free Syrian Army from PKK &amp; YPG elements in Syria</i></p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/971517824832360449">https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/971517824832360449</a></p>
	Lenco Bearcat G2	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/879998344789200896?s=20">https://twitter.com/CivilWarMap/status/879998344789200896?s=20</a></p>





VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>ZSU-23-2 (low-altitude air defense &amp; high performance against land targets)</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/AntiAircra&lt;br/&gt;ftBro/status/11828796341925&lt;br/&gt;15072?s=20">https://twitter.com/AntiAircra ftBro/status/11828796341925 15072?s=20</a></p>
	<p>BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicle</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/oryxspioe&lt;br/&gt;nkok/status/9678597448232&lt;br/&gt;26369">https://twitter.com/oryxspioe nkok/status/9678597448232 26369</a></p>
	<p>MT-LB</p>	<p><a href="https://tr.topwar.ru/96644-&lt;br/&gt;podelki-kurdskih-opolchencev-&lt;br/&gt;modernizaciya-bronetehniki-v-&lt;br/&gt;severnoy-sirii.html">https://tr.topwar.ru/96644- podelki-kurdskih-opolchencev- modernizaciya-bronetehniki-v- severnoy-sirii.html</a></p>
	<p>BRDM-2</p>	<p><a href="https://tr.pinterest.com/pin/4&lt;br/&gt;66474473880696993/">https://tr.pinterest.com/pin/4 66474473880696993/</a></p>
	<p>Fath Safir Jeep with 106mm GTT</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/metesoht&lt;br/&gt;aoglu/status/962384665079&lt;br/&gt;353344/photo/1">https://twitter.com/metesoht aoglu/status/962384665079 353344/photo/1</a></p>
	<p>Infantry fighting vehicles modified/customized with 12.7mm W85 and 14.5mm KPV over T-55 tank frame</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/oryxspioe&lt;br/&gt;nkok/status/932990348808&lt;br/&gt;327169">https://twitter.com/oryxspioe nkok/status/932990348808 327169</a></p>

## TANKS

VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	T-55	<a href="https://tr.topwar.ru/96644-podelki-kurdskih-opolchencev-modernizaciya-bronetehniki-v-severnoy-sirii.html">https://tr.topwar.ru/96644-podelki-kurdskih-opolchencev-modernizaciya-bronetehniki-v-severnoy-sirii.html</a>
	T-72	<a href="https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syria-kurdish-women-fighters-commandeer-tank-battle-over-menagh-air-base-1543352">https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syria-kurdish-women-fighters-commandeer-tank-battle-over-menagh-air-base-1543352</a>
	T-62	<a href="https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1348625994480025605/photo/2">https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1348625994480025605/photo/2</a>





## OTHER LAND VEHICLES

VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	Toyota Hilux	<a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kurdish_YPG_Fighters_(11486086916).jpg">https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kurdish_YPG_Fighters_(11486086916).jpg</a>
	Toyota Land Cruiser	<a href="https://ekurd.net/kurdish-forces-withdraw-serekaniye-2019-10-20">https://ekurd.net/kurdish-forces-withdraw-serekaniye-2019-10-20</a>

## MORTARS

VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>Mortar 60mm</p>	<p><a href="https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/2472020-61385">https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/2472020-61385</a></p> <p><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/pence-yildirim-operasyonunda-cok-sayida-silah-muhimmat-ve-orgutsel-dokuman-ele-gecirildi/2235611">https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/pence-yildirim-operasyonunda-cok-sayida-silah-muhimmat-ve-orgutsel-dokuman-ele-gecirildi/2235611</a></p>
	<p>Mortar 120mm</p>	<p><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-mortars-found-in-terrorist-ygg-pkk-arsenal-in-syria/1635220#">https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-mortars-found-in-terrorist-ygg-pkk-arsenal-in-syria/1635220#</a></p>
	<p>Mortar 82mm</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/teroretavi_zyok_/status/870989346257743872">https://twitter.com/teroretavi_zyok_/status/870989346257743872</a></p>
	<p>Mortar 81mm</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/teroretavi_zyok_/status/1007899310942507008">https://twitter.com/teroretavi_zyok_/status/1007899310942507008</a></p> <p><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/pence-yildirim-operasyonunda-cok-sayida-silah-muhimmat-ve-orgutsel-dokuman-ele-gecirildi/2235611">https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/pence-yildirim-operasyonunda-cok-sayida-silah-muhimmat-ve-orgutsel-dokuman-ele-gecirildi/2235611</a></p>





## ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND FIRE-SUPPORT WEAPONRY

VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>RPG-7 Variants and Iran-made ammunition</p>	<p><a href="https://armamentresearch.com/kurdish-ypg-forces-with-iranian-tandem-heat-rpg-7-projectile/">https://armamentresearch.com/kurdish-ypg-forces-with-iranian-tandem-heat-rpg-7-projectile/</a></p> <p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1378327875527528452?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1378327875527528452?s=20</a></p>
	<p>RPG-7V (reported to be Bulgaria-made)</p>	<p><a href="https://silahreport.com/2020/08/27/northern-iraq-pkk-weapon-caches-of-operation-claw-tiger-miles-check-this/">https://silahreport.com/2020/08/27/northern-iraq-pkk-weapon-caches-of-operation-claw-tiger-miles-check-this/</a></p>
	<p>Type 69 RPG (Soviet RPG-7 China variant)</p>	<p><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/kurdishstruggle/15473684731/">https://www.flickr.com/photos/kurdishstruggle/15473684731/</a></p> <p><a href="https://www.pinterest.fr/pin/295126581813171506/sent/?invite_code=2e3de8000b5f4c3791129a6a802a1df&amp;sender=653866577057572491&amp;sfo=1">https://www.pinterest.fr/pin/295126581813171506/sent/?invite_code=2e3de8000b5f4c3791129a6a802a1df&amp;sender=653866577057572491&amp;sfo=1</a></p>
	<p>9M111 Fagot Soviet-Russian made ATGM</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1337321605706473472">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1337321605706473472</a></p>



VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>AGS-17 Grenade Launcher</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1184747935898263552/photo/2">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1184747935898263552/photo/2</a></p>
	<p>9M113 Konkurs ATGM</p>	<p><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/pyd-pkk-kirikhana-rus-antitank-fuzesiyle-saldirmis-/1050802">https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/pyd-pkk-kirikhana-rus-antitank-fuzesiyle-saldirmis-/1050802</a></p> <p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1371585650483429380?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1371585650483429380?s=20</a></p>
	<p>BGM-71 TOW ATGM</p>	<p><a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkish-stf-units-seize-ypgpkk-terrorists-explosives-in-syria">https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkish-stf-units-seize-ypgpkk-terrorists-explosives-in-syria</a></p> <p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1375812508343226368/photo/2">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1375812508343226368/photo/2</a></p> <p><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/terror-orgutu-ypg-pkk-abd-yapimi-anti-tank-fuzesiyle-osoya-saldirdi/1360912">https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/terror-orgutu-ypg-pkk-abd-yapimi-anti-tank-fuzesiyle-osoya-saldirdi/1360912</a></p>
	<p>M136 AT4 84mm</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1265230805288263682/photo/1">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1265230805288263682/photo/1</a></p>







VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>BM-21 Grad Rockets</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/SonKaleTurkiye2/status/977081279098294274">https://twitter.com/SonKaleTurkiye2/status/977081279098294274</a></p>
	<p>Mk 19 Grenade Launcher</p>	<p><a href="https://www.haberler.com/guvenlik-uzmani-agar-ypg-armasina-degil-silaha-8475678-haberi/">https://www.haberler.com/guvenlik-uzmani-agar-ypg-armasina-degil-silaha-8475678-haberi/</a></p>
	<p>RBG-6 Grenade Launcher</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1294607963194351616?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1294607963194351616?s=20</a></p>
	<p>MILAN ATGM</p>	<p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5yEAljxBdU#t=130">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5yEAljxBdU#t=130</a></p>




VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>PG-7T 40mm ammunition for RPG-7 variants</p>	<p><a href="https://www.conflictarm.com/downloadfile/?report_id=2568&amp;file_id=2574">https://www.conflictarm.com/downloadfile/?report_id=2568&amp;file_id=2574</a></p>
	<p>9M28F 122mm Grad MLRS</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1184769786032611328?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1184769786032611328?s=20</a></p>
	<p>Soviet-Russian 23mm Anti-Aircraft Gun variants / 23 x 152mm 2A7/2A7M</p>	<p><a href="https://silahreport.com/2020/08/27/northern-iraq-pkk-weapon-caches-of-operation-claw-tiger-miles-check-this/">https://silahreport.com/2020/08/27/northern-iraq-pkk-weapon-caches-of-operation-claw-tiger-miles-check-this/</a></p>
	<p>9K111 Fagot Soviet-Russian ATGMi*</p> <p><small>*PKK &amp; YPG terror propaganda video</small></p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1278698962053214208?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1278698962053214208?s=20</a></p>
	<p>Bulgaria-made PG-7VL and PG-7VT ammunition for RPG-7 variants</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1190334961599037440/">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1190334961599037440/</a></p>






VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>SPG-9 73mm recoilless gun and OG9V ammunition</p>	<p><a href="https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/hakkaride-pkkya-agirdarbe-agir-muhimmat-ele-gecirildi-41702569">https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/hakkaride-pkkya-agirdarbe-agir-muhimmat-ele-gecirildi-41702569</a></p> <p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1183731589357953024/">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1183731589357953024/</a></p>
	<p>M79 Osa</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/516174136436355072">https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/516174136436355072</a></p>
	<p>METIS M-1 (AT-13) Russian-made ATGM</p>	<p><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/mardinde-metis-m1-fuze-atesleyicisi-ele-gecirildi/744029">https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/mardinde-metis-m1-fuze-atesleyicisi-ele-gecirildi/744029</a></p>
	<p>RPG-7 variants AT-5 (9M113 Konkurs) Soviet-Russian ATGM</p>	<p><a href="https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/11122020-11445">https://www.msb.gov.tr/SlaytHaber/11122020-11445</a></p>



VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>Type-69 China-made RPG (DZGI-40)</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1327695409620406272?s=20">https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1327695409620406272?s=20</a></p>
	<p>PG-7-AT Iran-made RPG ammunition</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/AnalystMick/status/1279381165191856128?s=20">https://twitter.com/AnalystMick/status/1279381165191856128?s=20</a></p>
	<p>PG-7V and PG-7VM warheads for RPG-7</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1327695409620406272?s=20">https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1327695409620406272?s=20</a></p>
	<p>Type-63 107mm MLRS</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1183731589357953024">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1183731589357953024</a></p>
	<p>RPG-27 Tandem HEAT</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1190334961599037440">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1190334961599037440</a></p>







## MANPADS

VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>SA-7 and Strela series MANPADS variants</p>	<p><a href="https://www.indyturk.com/node/354476/haber/akar%C4%B1n-dost-bildi%C4%9Fimiz-baz%C4%B1-%C3%BCIkeler-pkkyaf%C3%BCzeler-verdis%C3%B6z%C3%BCn%C3%BCn-arkas%C4%B1ndaki-mesaj">https://www.indyturk.com/node/354476/haber/akar%C4%B1n-dost-bildi%C4%9Fimiz-baz%C4%B1-%C3%BCIkeler-pkkyaf%C3%BCzeler-verdis%C3%B6z%C3%BCn%C3%BCn-arkas%C4%B1ndaki-mesaj</a></p>
	<p>9K38 Igla (SA-18)</p>	<p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/14/kurdish-militants-just-challenged-turkish-air-power-in-a-major-way/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/14/kurdish-militants-just-challenged-turkish-air-power-in-a-major-way/</a></p>
	<p>SA-16 Igla</p>	<p><a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/pence-yildirim-operasyonunda-cok-sayida-silah-muhimmat-ve-orgutsel-dokuman-ele-gecirildi/2235611">https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/pence-yildirim-operasyonunda-cok-sayida-silah-muhimmat-ve-orgutsel-dokuman-ele-gecirildi/2235611</a></p> <p><a href="https://twitter.com/ozkok_a/status/862342016390356992">https://twitter.com/ozkok_a/status/862342016390356992</a></p>





## OTHER

VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>VS-50 anti-personnel land mine</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1372298766523437063">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1372298766523437063</a></p>



VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>ACOG 4x32 Rifle Scope</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1360889048106217473?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1360889048106217473?s=20</a></p>
	<p>Pulsar Digisight N550/760 Thermal &amp; Night Vision Optics</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1360889048106217473?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1360889048106217473?s=20</a></p>
	<p>Dedal-T4.642 Thermal Optic</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1287478501063483392/photo/3">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1287478501063483392/photo/3</a></p>
	<p>AKS-74U Meprolight M21 optic</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1363936804794204160">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1363936804794204160</a></p>





VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>AN/PAS-13 Thermal Weapon Sight</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/towersight/status/825978354813792256">https://twitter.com/towersight/status/825978354813792256</a></p>
	<p>AN/PVS-7</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/calibreobscura/status/1199008290342084608">https://twitter.com/calibreobscura/status/1199008290342084608</a></p>
	<p>EOTech Hologram</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1183071116866273281?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1183071116866273281?s=20</a></p>
	<p>AN/PEQ-2</p>	<p><a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/calibreobscura/status/1199008331169447936?lang=ar-x-fm">https://mobile.twitter.com/calibreobscura/status/1199008331169447936?lang=ar-x-fm</a></p>








VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>Pulsar Apex XD75 Thermal Weapon Scope</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1204018687444951041">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1204018687444951041</a></p>
	<p>GP-30 Grenade Launcher *</p> <p>*(Probably from the Russian Federation or Syrian Arab Armed Forces inventories)</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199009230218510342/photo/3">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199009230218510342/photo/3</a></p>
	<p>SilencerCo Omega 300</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199016723757830151">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199016723757830151</a></p>
	<p>AN/PEQ-15 Tactical Target Pointer Device</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199016723757830151">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199016723757830151</a></p>





VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	SKA556	<a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199009276343308289/photo/2">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199009276343308289/photo/2</a>
	Dedal-T4.642 Hunter thermal scope	<a href="https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1386984934238212097?s=20">https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1386984934238212097?s=20</a>

## DRONES

VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	RQ-20 Puma	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAB8kU6s4g4">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAB8kU6s4g4</a>
	DJI Phantom	<a href="https://twitter.com/Acemal71/status/934849154169352192">https://twitter.com/Acemal71/status/934849154169352192</a>
	DJI Mavic	<a href="https://dronedj.com/2017/11/13/dji-mavic-pro-rigged-with-bomb-seized-in-turkey/">https://dronedj.com/2017/11/13/dji-mavic-pro-rigged-with-bomb-seized-in-turkey/</a>





VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	DJI Matrice 600	<a href="https://twitter.com/TarMilus/status/1388178972417089538/photo/1">https://twitter.com/TarMilus/status/1388178972417089538/photo/1</a>
	X-UAV TALON	<a href="https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1339551393053609986/photo/1">https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1339551393053609986/photo/1</a>

## OTHER WEAPONS






VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	7.62/39mm AK-based, a modified rifle with an extended barrel and rifle scope	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eZ4MwgViQI">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eZ4MwgViQI</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/Southwood/status/915558404499709952">https://twitter.com/Southwood/status/915558404499709952</a>
	FN FAL	<a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/kurdishstruggle/25551205403/">https://www.flickr.com/photos/kurdishstruggle/25551205403/</a>










VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	Glock	<a href="https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/glock-pistols-found-in-pkk-raid-in-southeast-100837">https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/glock-pistols-found-in-pkk-raid-in-southeast-100837</a>
	M15	<a href="https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2021/05/15/abdden-garip-m-16-savunmasi">https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2021/05/15/abdden-garip-m-16-savunmasi</a>
	M16A1 (Colt 603)	<a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1332634152089358336/photo/1">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1332634152089358336/photo/1</a>
	M16 Variants	<a href="https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2018/03/07/fotokapan-ile-goruntulenen-pkkli-terorist-olduruldu">https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2018/03/07/fotokapan-ile-goruntulenen-pkkli-terorist-olduruldu</a>  <a href="https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/msb-irak-kuzeyinde-pkky-ait-silah-ve-muhimmat-ele-gecirildi-41779262">https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/msb-irak-kuzeyinde-pkky-ait-silah-ve-muhimmat-ele-gecirildi-41779262</a>









VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>PKS Machine Gun</p>	<p><a href="https://www.aksam.com.tr/foto-galeri/dunya/abdnin-terror-orgutu-pkky-verdigi-silahlarin-turkiyeye-karsi-kullanilmasindan-endise-ediliyor/45183/14">https://www.aksam.com.tr/foto-galeri/dunya/abdnin-terror-orgutu-pkky-verdigi-silahlarin-turkiyeye-karsi-kullanilmasindan-endise-ediliyor/45183/14</a></p> <p><a href="https://www.google.nl/amp/s/www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkish-stf-units-seize-yppgpk-terrorists-explosives-in-syria/amp">https://www.google.nl/amp/s/www.dailysabah.com/politics/war-on-terror/turkish-stf-units-seize-yppgpk-terrorists-explosives-in-syria/amp</a></p>
	<p>Colt M4 Infantry Rifle</p>	<p><a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/06/29/us-sends-120-trucks-of-weaponry-to-pkks-syrian-offshoot-pyd-in-a-week">https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/06/29/us-sends-120-trucks-of-weaponry-to-pkks-syrian-offshoot-pyd-in-a-week</a></p>
	<p>AGS-17 Grenade Launcher W85 Machine Gun</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1184747935898263552/">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1184747935898263552/</a></p>
	<p>Zijiang M99 Anti-Material Sniper Rifle</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/DelilSouleman/status/878241606675181568">https://twitter.com/DelilSouleman/status/878241606675181568</a></p>
	<p>MG3</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/SerioSito/status/571788520240619521?s=20">https://twitter.com/SerioSito/status/571788520240619521?s=20</a></p>







VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	FN MAG	<a href="https://magazine.ufmalmo.se/2017/05/1709/">https://magazine.ufmalmo.se/2017/05/1709/</a>
	DShK and DShK Remote-Control Mechanism	<a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/05/facing-storm-pkks-diy-aa-guns.html">https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/05/facing-storm-pkks-diy-aa-guns.html</a>
	KPV 14.5mm	<a href="https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/05/facing-storm-pkks-diy-aa-guns.html">https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/05/facing-storm-pkks-diy-aa-guns.html</a>
	NEA PDW-CCS 7.5 Canadian Infantry Rifle	<a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1188520379163316225">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1188520379163316225</a>
	AK-47, AKM, AK-74 Rifle Variants	<a href="https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1336437334959665152/photo/2">https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1336437334959665152/photo/2</a>  <a href="https://twitter.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1130853538563629057">https://twitter.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1130853538563629057</a>  <a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1373211768709906434/photo/3">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1373211768709906434/photo/3</a>









VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>NSG-1 / CS-LR4 China-made Sniper Rifle</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1294607963194351616">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1294607963194351616</a></p>
	<p>AK-104</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1074673015932231680/photo/1">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1074673015932231680/photo/1</a></p> <p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199009276343308289?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199009276343308289?s=20</a></p>
	<p>AK-74M</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1344616248227864580?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1344616248227864580?s=20</a></p>
	<p>Type-56</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/AnalystMick/status/1215258274486018048?s=20">https://twitter.com/AnalystMick/status/1215258274486018048?s=20</a></p>
	<p>PM md. 63</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1375859800458813447?s=20">https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1375859800458813447?s=20</a></p>
	<p>AMD-63</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/MinsterTX/status/875700607482564610/photo/1">https://twitter.com/MinsterTX/status/875700607482564610/photo/1</a></p>










VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	<p>PSL-54C</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1184747935898263552?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1184747935898263552?s=20</a></p>
	<p>Golan S-01 (Syria-made, Austria-made Steyr HS-50 clone, anti-material sniper rifle)</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1321479169625235456?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1321479169625235456?s=20</a></p>
	<p>Colt Carbine and M4 infantry rifles, Pulsar thermal optic, ACOG rifle scope</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1315718469665648641?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1315718469665648641?s=20</a></p>
	<p>GP-30 UGL (grenade launcher), with AK-74 infantry rifle</p>	<p><a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1082037396303155200?s=20">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1082037396303155200?s=20</a></p>



VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	Zagros	<a href="https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2017/08/17/us-backed-kurdish-fighters-follow-in-footsteps-of-wwii-marine-raiders-with-homemade-sniper-rifle/">https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2017/08/17/us-backed-kurdish-fighters-follow-in-footsteps-of-wwii-marine-raiders-with-homemade-sniper-rifle/</a>
	Sako TRG-22	<a href="https://twitter.com/analystmick/status/1217714733765275651?lang=en">https://twitter.com/analystmick/status/1217714733765275651?lang=en</a>
	SVD Dragunov (KNS)	<a href="https://twitter.com/analystmick/status/1280904409313132544">https://twitter.com/analystmick/status/1280904409313132544</a>
	AN/PAS 13 Thermal Weapon Sight (on SVD Sniper Rifle)	<a href="https://twitter.com/towersight/status/825978354813792256?s=20">https://twitter.com/towersight/status/825978354813792256?s=20</a>
	Blaser R93	<a href="https://steemit.com/en-us/@yasinakdere/operationolivbranch-operationolivenzweig-german-sniper-rifles-are-in-the-hands-of-pkk-terrorists-what-a-mess-the-west-has-in-4e44821b686a">https://steemit.com/en-us/@yasinakdere/operationolivbranch-operationolivenzweig-german-sniper-rifles-are-in-the-hands-of-pkk-terrorists-what-a-mess-the-west-has-in-4e44821b686a</a>
	Zastava M93	<a href="https://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2017/04/21/sdf-forces-modified-zastava-m93/">https://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2017/04/21/sdf-forces-modified-zastava-m93/</a>



VISUAL	TYPE	SOURCE
	Zastava M84	<a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/kurdishstruggle/26143921086/">https://www.flickr.com/photos/kurdishstruggle/26143921086/</a>
	Zastava M76	<a href="https://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/move-against-kurd-rebels-turkey-iran-agenda%E2%80%94erdogan">https://www.jordantimes.com/news/region/move-against-kurd-rebels-turkey-iran-agenda%E2%80%94erdogan</a>
	CQ 5.56 mm	<a href="https://www.conflictarm.com/downloadfile/?report_id=2568&amp;file_id=2574">https://www.conflictarm.com/downloadfile/?report_id=2568&amp;file_id=2574</a>
	MK 17	<a href="https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199009741592309761">https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1199009741592309761</a>
	M249	<a href="https://twitter.com/calibreobscura/status/1210236700934463488">https://twitter.com/calibreobscura/status/1210236700934463488</a>



# 07 // 2021

FOREIGN POLICY & SECURITY 2021/07/EN

## IN THE SHADOW OF GUNS: ARMAMENT TRENDS OF THE PKK & YPG TERRORIST NETWORK

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